I. Introduction
The privatization of government services is a recent major policy shift largely driven by expected cost savings.1 Despite the potential savings from privatization, most public services are still provided by government employees (Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1997) . Strong resistance from beneficiaries of the public system, such as municipal unions, might slow the privatization movement in part because government-sanctioned monopolization of municipal services allows unions to obtain rent for their members. Theory suggests that municipal unions can successfully oppose privatization by supporting candidates financially and deploying members to promote candidates who oppose privatization (Peltzman, 1976) .
We contribute to the understanding of privatization and labor-cost savings by examining the earnings and employment patterns of union and nonunion, public and private refuse workers. Limiting our analysis to refuse allows us to examine a ubiquitous service that can be easily provided by private firms (Lopez-de-Salines et al., 1997) . The industry's highly elastic labor demand reduces the effectiveness of labor strikes and operation slowdowns as methods of union coercion. 2 Rather, unions are more likely to use political pressure to resist privatization. Hence, we use Peltzman's theory on political determinants of policy change as a framework for examining privatization and labor costs. 3
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The hypotheses derived from Peltzman's model are tested by initially estimating separate public-private earnings differentials for union and nonunion refuse workers employed in the public and private sectors to determine if unions benefit from the public system. Following that analysis, we explore whether union refuse workers in the public sector possess unmeasured attributes that command higher earnings than their counterparts in private firms. Such an analysis indicates whether union earnings premiums are a potential source of labor-cost savings. Last, we estimate a public sector-union status equation that includes the population of metropolitan areas and the percentage of the employed population that belongs to a union as determinants of refuse worker status to identify the type of municipalities that are more likely to use low-wage refuse workers.
II. Municipal Unions and Privatization in the Refuse Industry
Past findings report substantial cost savings from privatization of refuse collection. For instance, Bennett and Johnson (1979) show that at the mean, consumers receiving refuse service from government paid nearly 50 percent higher fees. 4 Moreover, there has been a substantial increase in nonunion workers employed by private refuse companies. The employment share of nonunion private sector workers increased from 15.5 to 43 percent between 1983 and 1996 (Figure 1) . The large gain in nonunion private sector employment reflects the relative ease of using alternative providers. The share of public sector employees fell from 80.11 to 49.5 percent over the same period. A 21 percentage point employment share decline in nonunion public sector workers explains most of the erosion in this sector. In comparison, the share of union workers in the public sector fell 10 percentage points during the same period. The relatively smaller employment share erosion of union workers suggests that unions are better able to protect their members from job displacement associated with privatization.
Avoiding member displacement is most likely linked to municipal unions successfully supporting the election of officials who oppose privatization, especially given the ineffectiveness of strikes in a labor market with a large pool of replacement workers. A framework that identifies how unions promote the election of their preferred officials is found in Peltzman's (1976) model, which emphasizes factors influencing the election of policymakers as key determinants of government decisions.
In Peltzman's model, supporters of public refuse are highly likely to vote if the gains from using public workers to provide refuse collection are greater than the campaign and organizing costs required to elect their candidate. Nonsupporters are less likely to vote if the union campaign can show that the benefits of using public workers justify the associated high cost.
Labor unions are the ideal pressure group to increase the probability of a majority vote for its candidate. For example, a union's monopoly control over the public sector labor supply strengthens its ability to negotiate higher wages, and higher wages raise the probability that unionized public workers will vote to oppose privatization. Union funds support advertising campaigns promoting candidates who favor public
